Good faith and collective bargaining under the Employment Relations Act 2000 : likely permissable bargaining tactics by Cummack, Delwyn.
AS741 
vuw 
A66 
C971 
2002 
DELWYN CUMMACK 
GOOD FAITH AND COLLECTIVE BARGAINING 
UNDER THE EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS ACT 
2000 _:LIKELY PERMISSIBLE BARGAINING 
TACTICS 
LLM RESEARCH PAPER 
LAWS 532 - EMPLOYMENT LAW 
LAW FACULTY 
VICTORIA UNIVERSITY OF WELLINGTON 
2002 
,... ' 
> -, 
t 
~ 
' , 
Victoria 
UNIVERSITY OF WELLINGTON 
T~ Whare Wananga 
o te Upoko o te Ika a Maui 
--~· 
LIBRARY 
CONTENTS 
ABSTRACT 
I 
II 
III 
IV 
INTRODUCTION 
GENERAL - THE ERA AND GOOD FAITH IN 
COLLECTIVE BARGAINING 
A Object/ Purpose - s 3 
B General Good Faith Requirements - s 4 
C Specific Collective Bargaining Good Faith Provisions 
1 Part 5 - s 32 
2 Code for Good Faith Bargaining 
D New Zealand Case Law - Independent Newspapers Ltd 
E North American Good Faith Law 
I Application to New Zealand 
2 US Legislation 
3 Canadian Legislation 
4 Differences 
"SURF ACE BARGAINING" WHAT IS THE LINE BETWEEN 
HARD AND SURFACE BARGAINING UNDER THE ERA? 
A Relevant ERA Provisions 
1 Duty to meet for the purposes of bargaining and to 
consider and respond to proposals- s 32(1)(b) and (c) 
2 The code 
3 No duty to conclude agreement - s 33 
4 Timeframe 
5 New Zealand Case Law 
6 Substance of proposals 
B North American Jurisprudence 
I US surface bargaining jurisprudence 
2 Canadian surface bargaining jurisprudence 
C Conclusions on Surface Bargaining 
"PARELLEL BARGAINING" - CAN EMPLOYERS BARGAIN 
WITH NON-UNION MEMBER EMPLOYEES CONCURRENTLY 
WITH OR PRIOR TO BARGAINING WITH UNIONS? 
A 
B 
ERA Prohibition on Preference and Voluntary Union 
Membership - sections 7 and 9 
Duty not to undermine - s 32(1)(d)(iii) 
1 Setting the standard 
2 New Zealand Case Law 
4 
5 
6 
6 
6 
7 
7 
9 
9 
10 
10 
1 I 
12 
12 
13 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
17 
19 
19 
19 
21 
28 
29 
29 
30 
30 
31 
2 
C North American Jurisprudence 32 
I Canada 32 
2 us 34 
D Conclusions on parallel bargaining 34 
V COMMUNICATIONS WITH EMPLOYEES - WHAT 
CAN EMPLOYERS COMMUNICATE TO EMPLOYEES? 35 
A ECA- Factual Information 35 
B Relevant ERA Provisions - s 32(1)(d)(ii), "Bargaining" - s 5 
and s 4(3) 36 
1 Intent of the Act/ Alterations to the Bill 36 
2 s 4(3) 38 
3 Extended definition of "bargaining" - s 5 39 
4 Union misinforming members 39 
5 Provide communication to union first 40 
C North American Jurisprudence 41 
I us 41 
2 Canada 43 
D Likely Position under the ERA 48 
E Possible Solution - Agreement on Communications 49 
F Conclusions on Communications 50 
VI GENERAL CONCLUSION ON PERMISSIBLE TACTICS 
UNDER THE ERA 50 
BIBLIOGRAPHY 52 
3 
LAW LIBRARY 
VICTORIA UNIVERSITY OF WELLINGTON 
ABSTRACT 
This paper explores the likely permissible tactics for employers in collective bargaining 
under the good faith regime of the Employment Relations Act 2000 (the ERA) in general 
and in three specific areas. 
Firstly it explores the good faith obligations of the Act generally and in relation to 
collective bargaining and the Independent Newspapers Ltd case which suggests that 
good faith issues will be decided on a case-by-case basis. This paper looks at North 
American good faith law for the reason that it is useful in the early days of good faith in 
New Zealand to borrow from jurisprudence established over several decades under a 
similar scheme. 
Specifically this paper explores what the line is likely to be in regard to "surface 
bargaining" or "going through the motions " under the ERA. This behaviour will breach 
s 32(1) of the Act and the ERA imposes obligations on the employer (and union) to 
discuss proposals, provide explanations for proposals or opposition to proposals, 
consider proposals for a reasonable period and consider alternative options when 
disagreement arises. Therefore there may be a similar obligation to that in Canada to 
make every reasonable effort to conclude a collective agreement. The types of behaviour 
that may evidence surface bargaining are also discussed in this section of the paper. 
The paper also specifically examines the issue of "parallel bargaining". That is, whether 
employers can bargain with non-union employees concurrently with or prior to 
bargaining for a collective agreement with unions. The real issue here is the setling of 
limits on achievable terms and conditions and the question will probably be whether the 
union or bargaining has been undermined. 
This paper then looks at whether employers can communicate anything to employees 
during collective bargaining, particularly in regard to the bargaining. This has certainly 
changed from the Employment Contracts Act (ECA) standard and although in theory 
communications relating to the bargaining will probably be allowed, they will be subject 
to strict conditions. 
The paper concludes that there are many changes to permissible bargaining tactics in 
collective bargaining situations under the ERA, following from the very different objects 
of the new Act, and that employers and unions should proceed with caution in the areas 
concerned until the duties involved are more certain. The author looks forward to future 
jurisprudence to clarify the uncertainties identified in this paper. 
The text of this paper (excluding contents page, footnotes and bibliography) 
comprises approximately 13,400 words) 
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I INTRODUCTION 
The good faith duty under the Employment Relations Act 2000 (ERA) has created 
uncertainty as to what tactics will be permissible in collective bargaining. This paper 
deals with three of the challenges under the new regime; surface bargaining, bargaining 
with non-union employees concurrently with or prior to unions, and employer/employee 
communications. These have been identified as key areas that have yet to be worked out 
in New Zealand jurisprudence.
1 
This paper outlines the ERA provisions dealing with good faith in general and 
those specifically relating to collective bargaining. It then discusses how the courts are 
likely to approach the good faith issue, looking at the NZ Amalgamated Engineering 
Printing & Manufacturing Union (Inc) v Independent Newspapers Ltcf (Independent 
Newspapers Ltd) case. This paper then examines the likely dividing line between 
'·surface bargaining" and hard bargaining under the ERA, drawing from North American 
jurisprudence and various academic commentary. Following this the issue of " parallel 
bargaining" and issues surrounding disparity of terms and conditions between union 
members and non-union employees will be discussed. Finally this paper will look at 
employer-employee communications and how the situation has changed from that under 
the Employment Contracts Act. The new prohibition on communications and its likely 
application will be outlined, drawing again on orth American jurisprudence. This paper 
aims to explore the likely permissible tactics in these areas and make useful , but 
necessarily speculative, suggestions as to what will be prudent measures for employers 
and unions under the ERA. 
1 Ellen Dannin, "Good Faith Bargaini ng, Direct Dealing and Information Requests : The US Experience" 
(200 I) 26 NZJIR 45. Identifies collective barga ining and direct dealing as areas of uncertainty. 
1 NZ Amalgamated Engineering Printing & Manufacturing Union (Inc) v Independent Newspapers Ltd (3 
August 200 I) Employment Relations Authority Wellington WA 51 /0 I, G J Wood (Independent 
Newspapers Ltd) 
5 
II GENERAL THE ERA AND GOOD FAITH IN COLLECTIVE 
BARGAINING: 
A Object/purpose - s 3 
In looking at how the ERA is likely to be interpreted it is important to examine 
the object and purpose of the legislation. The Employment Relations Authority (the 
Authority) has held that "the meaning of the provisions of the Act are likely to be 
ascertained from its text and in light of its purpose."
3 Similarly Chief Justice Thomas 
Goddard has stated that the meaning of an enactment must be ascertained from the text 
and that the purpose of the Act wi II elucidate that text.
4 The object of the ERA is ''to 
build productive employment relationships through the promotion of mutual trust and 
confidence in all aspects of the employment environment and ... relationship."
5 This 
object is to be achieved in several ways including; recognising that employment 
relationships must be built on good faith behaviour, acknowledging and addressing the 
inherent inequality of bargaining power in employment relationships and promoting 
collective bargaining.6 The object of the ERA is very different to that of the Employment 
Contracts Act 1991 , which was to ''promote an efficient labour market"
7
. Therefore it 
seems likely that the courts will interpret this legislation with a new focus on fostering 
collective bargaining. It must be kept in mind that under the ERA collective bargaining is 
a preference rather than just an option. 
B General Good Faith Provisions - s 4 
Section 4( I )(a) of the ERA states in general terms that the parties to an 
"employment relationship" must deal with each other in good faith. Subsection (b) 
provides that the parties must not, whether directly or indirectly, do anything to mislead 
3 Independent Newspapers Ltd, above, 17 
4 See Pat Wal sh and Raymond Harbridge '·Re-regul ati on of Bargaining in New Zea land : The ERA 2000" 
[200 I] 27 Australian Bull etin of Labour 43,44. 
5 Employment Relati ons Act 2000, s 3(a) 
6 Employment Relations Act 2000, s 3(a) 
7 Empl oyment Contracts Act 1991 , Long titl e. 
6 
or deceive each other, or that is likely to mislead or deceive each other. "Employment 
relationship" is defined bys 4(2) and includes the following: 
a) Employer and employee; 
b) Union and employer; 
c) Union and union members; 
d) Union and another union; 
e) Union and members of another union; and 
f) Employer and another employer. 
The last three cases are only employment relationships under s 4(2) where botp are 
bargaining for or parties to, the same collective agreement. 
Section 4(4) sets out a non-exhaustive list of some of the areas where good faith is 
to apply.8 This includes bargaining for a collective agreement or for a variation of a 
collective agreement and matters relating to the initiation of bargaining. Therefore 
whenever an employer or union is initiating or carrying out bargaining in regard to a 
collective agreement, they will be under an obligation to act in good faith toward, and not 
to mislead or deceive, the other party. 
C Specific Collective Bargaining Good Faith Provisions - Part 5, S 32 and Code 
for Good Faith Bargaining 
I Part 5 - s 32 
Part 5 of the ERA especially s 32, further clarifies the obligations of parties to 
collective bargaining. The objects of Part 5 are to provide the main requirements of good 
faith in relation to collective bargaining, to provide for a code/codes to help the parties 
understand wha~d faith means in collective bargaining, and to recognise the view of 
parties as to what constitutes good faith. 9 In attempting to provide the core requirements 
~ 
8 Employment Relations Act 2000, s 4(5) states that the list in 4(4) is not exhaustive 
9 Employment Relations Act 2000, s 31. 
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and obligations of good faith the ERA essentially codifies matters that have been left to 
the common law in th~ United States. 10 
In order to comply with good faith during collective bargaining the union and the 
employer have to meet several minimum obligations that are relevant to this paper. They 
must meet each other from time to time for the purposes of bargaining' 
1 and consider and 
respond to proposals made by each other. 
12 They must also recognise the role and 
authority of any person chosen by each to be its representative or advocate. 13 The union 
and employer must not directly or indirectly bargain about matters relating to terms and 
conditions of employment with those persons represented by the other party, unless that 
other party has consented. 14 Finally the union and employer must not undermine or do 
anything that is likely to undermine the bargaining or the authority of the other in the 
bargaining. 15 
· Section 32(3) provides some assistance m regard to what will be looked at to 
\ 
determine whether a union and an employer are acting in good faith. The provisions of a 
code of good faith that are applicable to the circumstances of the union and the employer 
will be relevant, as will the provisions of any agreement about good faith entered into by 
the union and employer. Other relevant matters include the proportion of the employer' s 
employees who are members of the union and to whom the bargaining relates and any 
other matter considered relevant, including background circumstances and the 
circumstances of the union and employer. Section 32(4) states that in this subsection 
circumstances include the operational environment of the union and the employer and the 
resources available to each.; Good faith obligations may therefore be interpreted 
differently between the employer and a small under-resourced union as opposed to a large 
national union.
16 It is clear from this section that there should be an overall assessment of 
10 Ellen Dannin, "Good Faith Bargaining, Direct Dealing and Information Requests: The US Experience" 
(2001)26 ZJIR45, 54. 
11 Employment Relations Act 2000, s 32 ( 1 )(a) 
12 Employment Relations Act 2000, s 32 (l)(b) 
13 Employment Relations Act 2000, s 32 (l)(c)(i) 
14 Employment Relations Act 2000, s 32 (l)(c)(ii) 
15 Employment Relations Act 2000, s 32 ( 1 )(c)(iii) 
16 
P Churchman & P Roth, Employment Relations Act 2000 (New Zealand Law Society 2000) 12 
8 
whether a union and an employer are bargaining in good faith 111 the particular 
circumstances. 17 This ' totality ' approach has been adopted in North American 
jurisprudence and will be discussed later in this paper. 
2 Code for Good Faith Bargaining 
Under s 39 the Authority may have regard to any code of good faith (code), approved 
under s 35 and in force at the relevant time in determining whether or not the parties have 
acted in good faith in bargaining for a collective agreement. The code will not be 
determinative in itself but will act as a reference point for the Authority or court if 
relevant. 18 Chief Justice Goddard ' s view is that the ERA requires the court to have regard 
to any code of good faith and it is highly unlikely the court would choose to ignore the 
provisions of a relevant code. 19 It has been stated "[f]ollowing the guidance in the code 
will ensure that in most cases a question of whether or not an action is taken in good faith 
will not arise."20 
In many areas however the code does not provide a great deal of assistance, as will be 
shown throughout this paper. Also because s 32(5) states that the section does not limit 
the application of the duty of good faith in collective bargaining, conduct not specifically 
proscribed may be a breach of good faith obligations.
21 Therefore there is still some 
uncertainty as to exactly what good faith behaviour is and is not. It is likely that good 
faith obligations under the ERA will be determined on a case-by-case basis. 
D New Zealand Case Law - Independent Newspapers 
There has been very little judicial comment as yet in regard to good faith under 
the ERA. One recent case regarding good faith in collective bargaining is Independent 
17 
Geoff Davenport, "Good Faith Bargaining - What Does it Really Mean?" [2000] 6 ELB 120. 
18 Churchman and Roth , above, 13. 
19 
John Hughes "The Collective Bargaining Code of Good Faith" (2001) 26 NZJIR 59, 67-68. 
20 Hughes, above, 65 . 
"
1 Churchman and Roth, above, 5. 
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Newspapers Ltct22. This case did not provide any solid definition of non-compliant 
behaviour under the ERA. It was held that, " [i]t may be ... impossible to adequately 
define or describe behaviour that does not meet the test of being in good faith. However, 
the average person knows such behaviour when they see it." 23 The Authority took the 
approach that rather than providing direction or guidelines, each case in the area of good 
faith behaviour must be determined on its own merits. 24 This suggests a common sense 
case-by-case approach to good faith in collective bargaining, which is not particularly 
helpful in clarifying what is and what is not good faith behaviour. What is clear is that the 
standard is different from that under the ECA. For example, Baguley v Coutts Cars Ltcf5 
stated that behaviours that were previously allowed simply because they were not 
prohibited by contract may not be permissible under the ERA. 
E North American Good Faith Law 
1 Application to New Zealand 
Many commentators suggest looking to the US and Canada for assistance in 
regard to the meaning of good faith as labour law in these jurisdictions incorporates a 
duty of good faith between the parties. North American jurisprudence may be particularly 
useful in the early stages of the development of good faith in ew Zealand. Dann in states 
that "with the slate still mostly blank, it is useful to consider how comparable laws 
enacted elsewhere have been interpreted ."26 In the Independent Newspapers Ltd27 case 
the Authority did not accept that "North American case law should be the starting point 
for analysis of the good faith and collective bargaining provisions in the ERA 28 and the 
decision did not rely extensively on North American case law. However it was 
22 NZ Amalgamated Engineering Printing & Manufacturing Union (Jnc) v Independent Newspapers Ltd (3 
August 200 I) Employment Relations Authority Wellington, WA 51 /0 I, G J Wood. 
23 Independent Newspapers Ltd, above, 17. 
24 independent Newspapers Ltd, above, 17. 
25 AD25/0 I, 3 April 200 I, 48 cited in Independent Ne111spapers Ltd, above, 17 
26 
Ellen Dannin, "Good Faith Bargaining, Direct Dea ling and Infom1ation Requests: The US Experience" 
(2001) 26 NZJIR 45 
27 Independent Newspapers Ltd, above. 
28 Independent Newspapers Ltd, above, 17 
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acknowledged that it might be appropriately referred to and because of the common-
sense nature of many of the concepts explored by this body of case law it is likely to be 
applied in New Zealand.29 How good faith in collective bargaining has been interpreted 
in these jurisdictions will therefore be useful in predicting the tactics permissible under 
the ERA and will be examined throughout this paper. 
2 United States (US) Legislation 
The relevant legislation in the US is the National Labor Relations Act 1935 (NLRA) 
which is enforced and adjudicated by the ational Labor Relations Board (NLRB).
30 
Under this legislation once employees have selected a representative, the employer has an 
obligation to bargain with that representative and not to make any unilateral changes 
without bargaining. S 8(d) of the NLRA defines collective bargaining as,31 
the performance of the mutual obligation of the employer and the representative of the employees 
to meet at reasonable times and confer in good faith with respect to wages, hours, and other terms 
and conditions of employment. 
However that section also provides, "such obligation does not compel either party to 
agree to a proposal or require the making of a concession"
32 (Emphasis added). The 
framework of good faith is very similar to that of the ERA in requiring good faith but not 
compelling agreement. Unlike s 32 of the ERA the duty is not defined more specifically 
by the US Act33 rather it has been left to case law to develop. 
29 Independent Newspapers Ltd, above, 25 
30 
Ellen Dannin, "Good Faith Bargaining, Direct Dealing and Information Requests: The US Experience" 
(2001) 26 ZJIR 45, 47. 
31 Dannin, above, 49. 
32 Dannin, above, 49. 
33 
Geoff Davenport and Judy Brown Good Faith in Collective Bargaining (LexisNexis Butterworths, 
Wellington, 2002.) 26. 
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3 Canadian Legislation 
Like the ERA one of the central purposes of labour law in each Canadian 
jurisdiction is facilitating free collective bargaining. 34 All ten provincial jurisdictions in 
Canada either expressly or impliedly provide for the obligation to bargain in good faith. 35 
In the Federal jurisdiction and the majority of provinces the duty to bargain in good faith 
has two components; firstly a duty to bargain collectively in good faith and secondly to 
make every reasonable effort to reach a collective agreement.36 Similarly to the US the 
duty is not defined in the legislation but has been interpreted judicially as creating certain 
procedural requirements of unions and employers and prohibiting conduct that 
undermines the bargaining or the other party. 37 
4 Differences 
It should be noted that there are some key differences between Canada, the US 
and New Zealand. In the US and Canada there is a certification process whereby the 
majority of those likely to be included in the bargaining unit must vote in favour of 
joining the union. The union is then the exclusive bargaining agent for all employees in 
that bargaining unit. 38 This is where many good faith allegations arise in these 
jurisdictions, during "first contract" negotiations. 39 Certification cannot be challenged 
until ten months later so employers will try to drag negotiations out until this time has 
elapsed and they can apply to "decertify" the unit. Unions on the other hand would want 
to proceed quickly to achieve their goals before de-certification becomes a possibility.40 
34 Gina Fiorillo "Good Faith Bargaining in Canadian Labour Law" (2000) Prepared for The Council of 
Trade Unions, ew Zealand, 6. 
35 Fiorillo, above, 3. 
36 For example s 50(a) of the Canadian Labour Code RSC 1985, C L-2 requires parties bargaining 
collectively to do so in good faith and the British Columbia Labour Relations Codes 11(1) states that 
parties "must not fail or refuse to bargain collectively in good faith ... and make every reasonable effort to 
conclude a collective agreement." See Fiorillo, above, 7. 
37 Geoff Davenport and Judy Brown Good Faith in Collective Bargaining (Lexis exis Butterworths, 
Wellington , 2002.) 25. 
38 Davenport and Brown, above, 23. 
39 Anne Knowles & James Ritchie Practical Implications of Good Faith Bargaining (Report of Study Tour 
to USA and Canada 200 I) [200 I] NZJ I R 59, 2. 
4° Knowles and Ritchie, above, 2. 
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This is not likely to arise in New Zealand as coverage under the ERA is negotiable and 
there is no certification requirement.
41 
In the US if impasse is reached the employer is able to unilaterally implement its 
final offer. 42 In Canada the employer has the opportunity on one occasion before impasse 
to put its last offer directly to employees for a vote. The offer has to have been presented 
to the union first and the union given sufficient time to consider and respond to the 
offer.43 Also under s 80 of the Canadian Labour Code the Board can impose a first 
contract.44 Despite these differences there are many similarities between the obligations 
of parties to act in good faith in Canada, the US, and New Zealand. Because North 
American jurisprudence has had many years to develop, it will be useful in predicting the 
practical application of good faith law under the ERA. North American jurisprudence 
will be considered in more detail throughout this paper where relevant. 
III "SURFACE BARGAINING" - WHAT IS THE LINE BETWEEN 'HARD' 
AND 'SURFACE' BARGAINING UNDER THE ERA? 
Deciding whether a party has acted in good faith is difficult with ' surface 
bargaining' situations. This is where one of the parties is trying to give the appearance 
that bargaining is taking place while all the time trying to frustrate agreement.
45 
A Relevant ERA Provisions 
There are several provisions in the ERA that indicate surface bargaining is not 
compatible with the good faith obligations of the Act. Firstly there is a strong argument 
surface bargaining will amount to misleading or deceptive behaviour within the meaning 
of s 4 , as the outward impression of bargaining disguises the underlying reality of the 
41 Davenport and Brown, above, 23. 
42 
Knowles and Ritchie, above, 3. 
43 Knowles and Ritchie, above, 3. 
44 Royal Oak Mines v Canada (Labour Relations Board) [ 1996] I SCR 369, 9-10. 
45 Ellen Dannin , "Good Faith Bargaining, Direct Dealing and Information Requests: The US Experience" 
(200 I) 26 NZJIR 45 , 52. 
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intention of that party.46 Secondly surface bargaining will violate the duties of the 
employer and the union to meet from time to time for the purposes of the bargaining and 
consider and respond to proposals under s 32(l)(b) and (c).The Authority has agreed that 
surface bargaining and going through the motions of bargaining in an attempt to avoid 
true bargaining, would breach the ERA.47 The next question is how these provisions wiJl 
be interpreted and what will amount to surface bargaining, in other words what the line 
will be between surface bargaining and merely hard bargaining under the ERA. What 
does seem clear is that the approach of the Court of Appeal in Tucker Wool Processors 
Ltd v Harrison48 that collective employment contracts could be presented on a "take it or 
leave it" basis is no longer good law under the ERA.49 
I Duty to meet for the purposes of bargaining and consider and respond to 
proposals- s 32(J)(b) & (c) 
Under s 32( I) parties have a duty to meet each other from time to time for the 
purposes of bargaining, and to consider and respond to the others proposals. "Consider" 
and "respond" are not defined in the Act. In regard to the interpretation of this duty, the 
Authority and the Courts are likely to adopt a "reasonableness" test given the wording of 
paragraph 4.5 of the code. 50 In terms of showing evidence that proposals have been 
considered and responded to a paper trail may be significant as "the depth and quality of 
a party's response can show whether they genuinely considered the proposal."51 
46 
Ma::engarb 's Employment Law "Employment Relations Act 2000" (Lexis exis Butterworths, 
Wellington, 2002.) Paras [32.22]" 'Surface' bargaining" and [32.32] "Good Faith in Bargaining for a 
Collective Agreement". 
47 
Z Amalgamated Engineering Printing & Manufacturing Union (Inc) v Independent ewspapers Ltd (3 
August 200 I) Employment Relations Authority Wellington, WA 51 /0 I, G J Wood, 25 
48 
[ 1999] ERNZ 894 
49 
P Churchman & P Roth , Employment Relations Act 2000 (New Zealand Law Society 2000) I 0 
50 Geoff Davenport and Judy Brown Good Faith in Collective Bargaining (LexisNexis Butterworths, 
Wellington , 2002.) 81. 
51 Davenport and Brown, above, 81 . 
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2 The code 
As previously mentioned the provisions of any relevant code are included in 
matters to be considered under s 32(3) in deciding whether parties are dealing with each 
other in good faith. There are four clauses that are relevant to surface bargaining and to s 
32(1)(b) and (c). In regard to the meetings required by the s 32(l)(b) the Code provides 
-2 
that these will/ 
provide an opportunity for the parties to discuss proposals relating to the bargaining, provide 
explanations of proposals relating to the bargaining, or where such proposals are opposed, provide 
explanations which the relevant party considers support the proposals or opposition to it. 
Paragraph 4.5 of the code states, "the parties will consider the other's proposals for a 
reasonable period. Where a proposal is not accepted, the party not accepting the proposal 
will offer an explanation for that non-acceptance. 53 Also paragraph 4.6 provides, "where 
there are areas of disagreement, the parties will work together to identity the barriers to 
agreement and will give further consideration to their respective positions in the light of 
any alternative options put forward." 
54 
Paragraph 4.7 of the Code was discussed in Independent Newspapers Ltcl
5 
and 
states the parties should attempt to reach an agreed settlement of any differences arising 
from the collective bargaining. The Authority held that " in this respect an impasse over 
one issue ... does not equate to an impasse over the whole of the bargaining. Proposals 
should continue to be raised, considered and responded to."
56 
52 Code of Good Faith for Bargaining for Collective Agreement, Para 3.3 cited in NZ Amalgamated 
Engineering Printing & Manufacturing Union (Inc) v Independent Newspapers Ltd (3 August 200 I) 
Employment Relations Authority Wellington, WA 51 /01, G J Wood, 15. 
53 Cited in Independent Newspapers Ltd, above, 16. 
54 Code of Good Faith for Bargaining for Collective Agreement, Para 4.6. Cited in independent 
Newspapers Ltd, above, 16. 
55 (3 August 200 I) Employment Relations Authority Wellington, WA 51 /0 I, G J Wood, l 5. 
56 Independent Newspapers Ltd, above, 25 . 
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To summarise the following basic duties are imposed by the ERA for good faith / 
bargaining between the parties, 
a) Discussion of proposals; 
b) Explanation supporting proposals or opposition to 
proposals; 
c) Consideration of proposals for a reasonable period; 
d) Explanation if a proposal is not accepted; and 
e) Reconsideration of the party 's position or consideration 
of alternative options arising from disagreements on 
matters involved in the bargaining. 
3 No duty to conclude agreement 
It must be remembered that under the ERA parties do not have to make concessions. 
Section 33 states that the duty of good faith in s 4 does not require parties to agree on any 
matter for inclusion in a collective agreement or enter into a collective agreement. This 
signals that the ERA is not a return to the awards system of 1894 under which if parties 
could not agree on the contents of a collective agreement an independent third party 
could impose an award. 57 However Hughes states, "the Code indicates that the duty 
extends to weighing the merits of proposals and providing reasoned explanations." 58 This 
may mean that parties are in fact under a duty to attempt in good faith to reach an agreed 
settlement of any differences. This is reinforced by s 159, which states that the Authority 
can direct mediation to this end. So although parties cannot be forced to conclude a 
collective agreement there may be a similar obligation to that in Canada to make every 
reasonable effort to come to agreement especially taking into account the similarity in the 
basic framework of the obligation in the two jurisdictions. 
57 
P Churchman & P Roth , Employment Relations Act 2000 (New Zealand Law Society 2000) 12 
58 John Hughes "The Collective Bargaining Code of Good Faith" (200 I) 26 NZJIR 59, 71. 
16 
-I Timeframe 
Section 4(4)(a) states that good faith applies to matters relating to the initiation of 
bargaining. This means, "care needs to be taken in what is said and done from the very 
first stages of the process."59 A party should only initiate collective bargaining if it 
genuinely wants to enter into a collective agreement. Doing this only as a "defensive 
strategy" (for example to undermine the resources of a counterpart) with no intention of 
concluding a collective agreement is probably a breach of good faith.
60 
5 New Zealand Case Law 
The Independent Newspapers Ltd6'case concerned an alleged failure to consider 
and respond to the union 's proposal for a multi-employer collective agreement (MECA). 
The employer's group representative wrote to the union stating,
62 
the union was told that while INL is prepared to consider their arguments for a [MECA] ... there 
was little enthusiasm for centralised bargaining ... while the company will fulfil the Act 's good 
faith obligations, the legislation in clear that the duty of good faith does not require the parties to 
enter into a collective agreement. 
The union responded that this suggested "an intention on the part of the company to 
engage in negotiations for a [MECA] in a perfunctory manner" which constituted a 
breach ofs 32(1)(b) & (c). The Manawatu Standard (one of the employers) also wrote 
that they were not interested in a MECA, as did the Christchurch and Southland Times. 
The Authority accepted the approach of Royal Oak Mines v Canada LRB
63 that 
the duty to enter into bargaining in good faith must be measured on a subjective 
standard.64 This subjective test goes to motivation so that if a party partakes in 'surface 
59 Geoff Davenport and Judy Brown Good Faith in Collective Bargaining (LexisNexis Butterworths, 
Wellington , 2002.) 121. 
60 Davenport and Brown, above, 121. 
61 
Z Amalgamated Engineering Printing & Manufacturing Union (Inc) v Independent Newspapers Ltd (3 
August 2001) Employment Relations Authority Wellington , WA 51 /0 I, G J Wood. 
62 Independent Newspapers Ltd, above, 4. 
63 133 DLR(4'11) 129. 
64 Royal Oak Mines v Canada LRB l 33 DLR ( 4'11 ) 129 followed in Independent Newspapers Ltd, above, 16. 
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bargaining', that is they have no real intention to bargain, the test of good faith bargaining 
is not met. The Authority recognised that inferences may be drawn as to subjective 
intention by objectively analysing the totality of the party ' s behaviour. 
In this case the Manawatu Standard was not directly represented at a bargaining 
meeting and the court held this was one factor that could be analysed and construed 
against them. The court felt that comments from the Manawatu Standard ' s representative 
showed that he had a closed-mind and was "not interested in taking parting a MECA."65 
The Authority accepted that he then went on to make a detailed response to the union 's 
claims. Ultimately though the Authority felt that the representative ' s evidence showed he 
was not interested in the outcome of negotiation. His inability to point to any actions on 
his part to find out what had happened at the meeting provided further evidence that he 
had a closed mind towards bargaining for a MECA. 
In regard to the other employer parties the Authority stated that they came to "a 
strong preference based on considered reasoning (from their perspective)" and showed 
that they were "amenable to listening to reasons why they should change their preference. 
Good faith requires no more than that in respect of keeping an open mind."66 However in 
regard to the MECA the Authority stated that while the INL (employer group) companies 
(with the exception of the Manawatu Standard) did not refuse to meet, consider and 
respond to the union ' s proposals entirely, they intended to do so in a very limited way 
only. Therefore the effective intention of the I L companies was to refuse to consider 
and respond to the substance of the union ' s proposals. This behaviour was held to be in 
breach of the employer ' s good faith obligations under s 32. 
The Authority stated that the employer should have genuinely considered the 
proposals for a MECA because, " it is not until the substance of the initiating party's 
proposals ... have all been considered and responded to that the type and structure of 
65 Independent Newspapers Ltd, above, 2 1. 
66 Independent Newspapers Ltd, above, 4, 22. 
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collective agreement(s) can be properly determined."
67 The Authority went on to assert 
that ''it may well be that detailed consideration of the union 's proposals on core 
conditions ... will clarify whether such proposals are workable and in the interests of all 
parties."68 As previously stated impasse over one issue should not be treated as impasse 
over the whole of the bargaining. 
6 Substance of proposals or merely object;ve aclfons 
In some limited circumstances the substantive proposals raised by a party might 
throw light on whether that party is engaging in "surface bargaining" when considered in 
the overall context of the party's other bargaining behaviour.
69 In North American cases 
there have been examples of breaches stemming from substantive proposals that evidence 
a lack of genuine intention to bargain. (See below). 
B North American Jurisprudence 
1 US Swface Bargaining Jur;sprudence 
Surface bargaining appears to have proven difficult for the NLRB to agree on. In 
a study of LRB decisions from 1980-1994, although many types of violations found 
agreement by the court at I 00%, surface bargaining was only 53%.
70 Nevertheless there 
are some guidelines that can be taken from this jurisdiction. As previously mentioned 
with regard to intent to bargain under the NLRA the law only requires the parties to 
conform their conduct (objectively viewed) to the law's requirements. Similarly with 
Canada US good faith does not impose a regime of right thinking. It is an objective 
standard judged on conduct. 
71 In alleged surface bargaining situations the court will look 
67 Independent Newspapers Ltd, above, 4, 25. 
68 Independent Newspapers Ltd, above, 25 . 
69 Ma::.engarb 's Employment Law "Employment Relations Act 2000" (LexisNexis Butterworths, 
Wellington, 2002.) Para (32.23] "Exam ining substantive proposals". 
70 
Ellen Dannin, "Good Faith Bargaining, Direct Dealing and Information Requests: The US Ex perience" 
(200 I) 26 NZJI R 45 , 50. 
71 Dannin , above, 51. 
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at the 'totality of the conduct' to see whether there has been a sincere effort to reach 
common ground. What is looked at is not one factor on its own but the totality of factors 
to determine whether the employer is trying to frustrate agreement. 72 
Partaking in any of the following behaviours without plausible explanation may 
demonstrate in the circumstances that the employer or union is merely going through the 
motions of bargaining, 
72 Dannin , above, 52. 
73 Dannin, above, 52. 
a) Where an employer or union makes an offer it knows 
will be unacceptable to the other party73 or impossible 
for that party to accept. 74 
b) Where a party is inflexible on major issues without 
legitimate reason. In other words "take-it-or-leave-it" 
bargaining. 75 
c) Where a party makes regressive proposals (that is 
shifting the goalposts so that agreement is continually 
postponed. This is also known as 'receding horizon' 
b · · 76 argam Ill g. 
d) Where the union or employer delays making offers or 
conducting bargaining.77 
e) Where they refuse to meet schedule meetings at times 
when it is difficult to proceed with bargaining78 
f) Where a party reneges on an agreement; 79 and 
g) Where a party presents fresh claims at the last minute.80 
74 
Anne Knowles & James Ritchie Practical Implications of Good Faith Bargaining (Report of Study Tour 
to USA and Canada 2001) (2001] NZJIR 59,5. 
75 Dannin , above, 52. 
76 Knowles and Ritchie, above, 5, Dannin , above, 52. 
77 Dannin , above, 52. 
78 Dannin , above, 52. 
79 Dannin, above, 52. 
BO Anne Knowles & James Ritchie Practical Implications of Good Faith Bargaining (Report of Study Tour 
to USA and Canada 2001) (2001] ZJIR 59, 5. 
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In order to comply with good faith obligations US jurisprudence indicates that the 
employer and union should do the following things. 
a) Demonstrate that they are willing to listen to and 
consider proposals and hold an honest and sincere 
desire to reach agreement. 81 In other words approach 
bargaining with an open mind; 
82 
b) Genuinely examine alternative options put forward by 
the other party; 83 
c) Provide legitimate justification for refusal of 
proposals;84 and 
d) Make reasonable efforts to conclude an agreement.
85 
2 Canadian surface bargainingjurisprudence 
As previously mentioned the Canadian Labour Code
86 states that the bargaining 
agent and employer shall meet and commence to bargain collectively in good faith and 
make eve,y reasonable effort to enter into a collective agreement. These requirements 
have been interpreted as prohibiting surface bargaining and requiring a genuine intention 
to bargain.Like s 33 of the ERA Canadian law does not require boards to intervene and 
evaluate the substantive content of bargaining proposals.
87 
Although the duty to bargain 
81 NLRB v Montgomery Ward & Co, [ 1943] 133 F 2d 676 (9th Cir) and NLRB v Boss Mfg Co, [ 1941] I 18 F 
2d 187 (7'h Cir) cited in Geoff Davenport and Judy Brown Good Faith in Collective Bargaining 
(LexisNexis Butterworths, Wellington, 2002.) 26. 
82 NLRB v George P Pilling & Son Ltd, [ 1941] I 19 F 2d 32 (3rd Cir) cited in Davenport and Brown, above, 
26. 
83 NLRB v Montgomery Ward & Co, [1943] 133 F 2d 676 (9th Cir) and NLRB v Boss Mfg Co, [ 1941] 118 F 
2d 187 (7'h Cir) Cited in Davenport and Brown, above, 26. 
84 NLRB v Montgomery Ward & Co, [ 1943] 133 F 2d 676 (9th Cir) and NLRB v Boss Mfg Co, [ 1941] 118 F 
2d 187 (7'h Cir) Cited in Davenport and Brown, above, 26. 
85 NLRB v George P Pilling & Son Ltd, [ 1941] 119 F 2d 32 (3rd cir) Cited in Davenport and Brown, above, 
26. 
86 RSC 1985, c., L-2 as am, S 50(a)(i)&(ii). 
87 Gina Fiorillo "Good Faith Bargaining in Canadian Labour Law" (2000) Prepared for The Council of 
Trade Unions, New Zealand, 6. 
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is mandatory the parties are not required to succeed in negotiating a collective agreement. 
Hard bargaining is permissible.88 Canadian Commercial Corporation v PSAC held, 89 
one party ... may possess particular economic power .. . at the time and may exercise it to the fullest 
extent possible. So long as this is done within a bargaining context where the ultimate intention is 
still to achieve a collective agreement ... it cannot be said that the bargaining has been carried out 
in bad faith ... The fact that either party takes a determined or adamant line on issues and engages 
in very hard bargaining does not of itself signal a violation of the law, so long as one party does 
not apparently intend by so doing to destroy the other. 
Compliance with the requirement to make every reasonable effort to enter into a 
collective agreement is measured objectively. The Board in Royal Oak Mines stated,90 
the duty to enter into bargaining in good faith must be measured on a subjective standard while the 
making of a reasonable effort to bargain should be measured by an objective standard which can 
be ascertained by a board looking to comparative standards and practices within the particular 
industry . This latter part of the duty prevents a party from hiding behind an assertion that it is 
sincerely trying to reach an agreement when viewed objectively, it can be seen that its proposal is 
so far from the accepted norms of the industry that they must be unreasonable. 
In other words the obligation to make every reasonable effort to conclude a collective 
agreement places limits on " the objective means that each side is entitled to use in 
carrying out its intentions."91 
Surface bargaining will only be found where "the conduct of the parties on the 
whole demonstrates that one side has no intention of concluding a collective agreement, 
notwithstanding its preservation of the outward manifestations of bargaining.',92 
(Emphasis added.) Cases suggest that surface bargaining may be quite difficult to show. 
If the employer can show any evidence of the existence of a genuine intention to bargain 
then this should be enough to displace such an accusation. In Catholic Independent 
88 Fiorillo, above, 8-9. 
89 Canadian Commercial Corporation and PSAC ( 1988) 74 di 175, 187 in Council of Railway Unions el al 
and Canadian National Railway, ( 1993) 23 CLRBR (2d) 122, 130. 
90 Royal Oak Mines v Canada (Labour Relations Board), [ 1996) I SCR 369, 396-397. 
91 Catholic Independent Schools, Diocese of Prince George v B. C Government and Service Employee's 
Union [2000] 62 CLRBR (2d) 125, Para 69. 
92 Catholic Independent Schools, Diocese of Prince George v B. C Government and Service Employee 's 
Union, above, Para 85 , following The Daily Times v Toronto Typographical Union [ 1978) 2 Can LRBR 
446, [1978) OLRB Rep. July 604. 
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Schools, Diocese of Prince George v B.C Government and Service Employee's Union
93 
the original panel found the employer had tabled a comprehensive bargaining proposal 
and was initially prepared to conclude a collective agreement with the union. The Board 
in its reconsideration stated this meant there was at some point an intention to conclude a 
collective agreement and this went to the very essence of surface bargaining. They held 
because the original panel found the employer was prepared to conclude a collective 
agreement provided the union agreed to a certain clause they were not guilty of surface 
b · · 94 arga1n111g. 
Many Canadian cases indicate a variety of tactics that have been found in their 
totality to constitute a breach of good faith.
95 In other words the courts look at the overall 
conduct of the parties and the 'entire context' of the negotiating history
96 rather than each 
act in isolation. This may mean that several seemingly minor events or actions could be 
taken in combination to evidence surface bargaining. The Board in Catholic Independent 
Schools, Diocese of Prince George v B.C Government and Service Employee's Union 
finding there was surface bargaining in its original decision stated,
97 
notwithstanding that more innocent explanations for some of [the] events could be accepted if 
viewed in isolation, we cannot, upon considering them as a whole, find that the employer intended 
to conclude a collective agreement with this union . The pattern of delay, roadblocks, 
preconditions and anti-union animus cumulatively evidence the absence of any intention to reach a 
collective agreement. While a party may just happen to adopt a non-productive bargaining strategy 
every now and again, a pattern of many render its probably that there is a grander scheme in 
existence." 
93 Catholic Independent Schools, Diocese of Prince George v B. C Government and Service Employee 's 
Union,[200 I ]69 CLRBR (2d) 1 (Reconsideration) 
94 Catholic Independent Schools, Diocese of Prince George v B. C Government and Service Employee's 
Union, (Reconsideration) above, Para 127. 
95 Gina Fiorillo "Good Faith Bargaining in Canadian Labour Law" (2000) Prepared for The Council of 
Trade Unions, ew Zealand, 9. 
96 SGS Canada Inc and ILWU Local S/8 (2000) BCLRB o B 121 /2000 Paras 22-23 , cited in Fiorillo, 
above, 9-10. 
97 Catholic Independent Schools, Diocese of Prince George v B.C Government and Service Employee's 
Un ion [2000] 62 CLRBR (2d) 125, Para I 03. 
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The employer applied for leave and reconsideration of this decision.98 They argued that 
the Board had held that several rights make a wrong. The Board confirmed the general 
approach in the original decision and held in its reconsideration that, 99 
the very essence of ... surface bargaining is that a party is using ... tactics which may 
appear legitimate in isolation, to disguise its real intention not to conclude a collective 
agreement at all. .. the original panel was required to assess whether facts which might 
seem neutral in isolation were, when assessed in the larger context, part of a pattern 
which would point to a finding of surface bargaining. 
Canadian case law provides some clues as to what types of behaviour will be 
likely to constitute surface bargaining. One of these behaviours is erecting barriers to the 
bargaining, for example by imposing preconditions, insisting on agreement on extraneous 
matters or taking up an inflexible bargaining position early on in negotiations. This is 
also known as "take-it-or-leave-it" bargaining. It should be remembered that "take-it-or-
leave-it" bargaining does not occur when a party reaches a stage in negotiations where it 
presents a "final offer". 100 In BC Rail Ltd1°1 the employers set a prerequisite to 
bargaining, demanding an agreement on the bargaining format. The board held that 
insistence on agreement over matters extraneous to collective bargaining constituted a 
breach of the duty to bargain in good faith. It was held that the employer erected a barrier 
to bargaining that was unjustified in the circumstances. However preconditions and 
inflexibility could also be evidence of hard bargaining if the employer regards the issues 
as critically important. The Board will look at the larger context to determine the nature 
of the intention of the parties. 102 
98 
Catholic Independent Schools, Diocese of Prince George v B. C Government and Service Employee 's 
Union [200 l )69 CLRBR (2d) I 
99 Catholic Independent Schools, Diocese of Prince George v B. C Government and Service Employee 's 
Union, (Reconsideration) above, Para I 12. 
IOO Canadian Association of Industrial, Mechanical and Allied Workers v oranda Metal Industries Ltd 
[ 1975) I CLRBR 145 (BC) cited in Geoff Davenport and Judy Brown Good Faith in Collective Bargai ning 
(LexisNexis Butterworths, Wellington, 2002.)77. 
IOI (1993) BCLRB No. 8157/93 cited in Gina Fiorillo "Good Faith Bargaining in Canadian Labour Law" 
(2000) Prepared for The Council of Trade Unions, New Zealand, 11. 
102 Catholic Independent Schools, Diocese of Prince George v B.C Government and Service Employee's 
Union [2000) 62 CLRBR (2d) 125, Paras 95-99. 
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Other behaviours that may be seen as erecting barriers to bargaining are 
refusing to meet on a timely basis
103 or sending a representative to the bargaining table 
who lacks the authority to settle or adequate knowledge of the issues involved in the 
negotiations.
104 Also coming to bargaining meetings ill-prepared to bargain has been 
found to be evidence of a lack of genuine intention to conclude a collective agreement. 
In Catholic Independent Schools, Diocese of Prince George v B.C Government and 
Service Employee's Union'
05 the employer's bargaining committee did not have and had 
not seen, a copy of union's proposal at a bargaining meeting although they had been 
forwarded one 8 months prior. The Board held this demonstrated, "a marked lack of 
respect for the effort made by the union and is consistent with surface bargaining".
106 
They concluded the employer was only going through the motions of bargaining in order 
to delay the onset of actual bargaining. 
It has also been held to be a breach of good faith where a party advances their 
position "without any attempt to justify, explain or rationalise it."
107 Southam Inc v 
GCIU Local 34-M
108 held that the depth of justification a party will reasonably be 
required to provide will be fact specific. Detailed justifications will more often be 
essential where the negotiations are for the first collective agreement or where one party 
seeks a major change either from the status quo or from provisions that are standard on a 
broad level or for the industry, and where there is no obvious rationale.
109 
Many Canadian surface bargaining cases arise where the employer is us111g 
delaying tactics in hope the union will be "decertified" before negotiations can take place 
I0
3 Starbucks Corporation v NAAA IWU Loe 3000 (1997) 35 CLRBR (2d) 244 (BC) cited in Geoff 
Davenport and Judy Brown Good Faith in Collective Bargaining (Lexis exis Butterworths, Wellington, 
2002.), 65. 
104 LIUNA, Loe I 059 v Old Oak Properties Inc [ 1996] OLRB Rep 648 (Ont) cited in Davenport and Brown, 
above, 65. 
105 Catholic Independent Schools, Diocese of Prince George v B.C Government and Service Employee 's 
Union [2000] 62 CLRBR (2d) 125 . 
106 Catholic Independent Schools, Diocese of Prince George v B. C Government and Service Employee 's 
Union, above, Paras 88-92. 
IO? Canadian Commercial Corp v PSAC ( 1988) 74 di 175, 186-188 cited in Geoff Davenport and Judy 
Brown Good Faith in Collective Bargaining (Lexis exis Butterworths, Wellington, 2002.) 78. 
108 [2000] 63 CLRBR (2d) 65 . 
109 Southam Inc v GCIU Local 3./-M (2000) 63 CLRBR (2d) 65 cited in Davenport and Brown, above, 79. 
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or where an employer or union is attempting to adjourn or suspend bargaining pending 
the outcomes of other proceedings.
11 0 In New Zealand the issue of decertification will not 
arise, but the same arguments may apply where an employer delays bargaining or 
employs surface bargaining tactics knowing or intending that the union will lose the 
support of its members. In Scott Chapman et al. and International Association of 
Machinists and Aerospace Workers, Beothuck Lodge 1763 and Courtesy Chrysler1
11 the 
employer relied on a decertification application from some of its employees as an excuse 
to suspend bargaining. 112 The Board found the employer was "dragging its feet, knowing 
that support for the union was weak and trying [to] improve prospects for a potential 
decertification." 113 The employer was found to be guilty of effectively refusing to 
bargain, despite giving regular written and verbal assurances to the contrary over the 
course of the negotiations. 114 
Canadian jurisprudence indicates that generally the reasonableness of the parties' 
proposals should not be appraised by the Board, rather the reasonableness of the conduct 
adopted in an effort to achieve agreement should be assessed.
11 5 Exceptions to this are 
where demands are contrary to law
11 6 or public policy, or proposals that indicate bad 
faith. 117 Substantive proposals may indicate bad faith where one party insists on demands 
that are outrageous, extreme or inflammatory 
11 8 This may not be sufficient on its own to 
equate to surface bargaining but will constitute part of the totality of conduct that a Board 
will look at. The Board in Scott Chapman et al. and International Association of 
110 Gina Fiorillo "Good Faith Bargaining in Canadian Labour Law" (2000) Prepared for The Council of 
Trade Unions, New Zealand, 11 . 
111 (200 I) 77 CLRBR (2d) 92 
112 Scot/ Chapman et al. and International Association of Machinists and Aerospace Workers, Beothuck 
Lodge 1763 and Courtesy Ch1ysler (200 I) 77 CLRBR (2d) 92, Para 23. 
113 Scott Chapman et al. and International Association of Machinists and Aerospace Workers, Beothuck 
Lodge 1763 and Courtesy Ch1ysler, above, Para 29. 
114 Scott Chapman et al. and International Association of Machinists and Aerospace Workers, Beothuck 
Lodge I 763 and Courtesy Chrysler, above, Para 29. 
115 Catholic Independent Schools, Diocese of Prince George v B.C Government and Service Employee 's 
Union [2000] 62 CLRBR (2d) 125, Para 70. 
116 Catholic Independent Schools, Diocese of Prince George v B.C Government and Service Employee's 
Union, above, Para 72. 
11 7 CKLW Radio Broadcasting Ltd v N.A.B.E.T [ 1977] 23 di 51 ,59. Cited in Council of Railway Unions v 
Canadian National Railway [ 1993] 23 CLRBR (2d) 122,130. 
118 Gina Fiorillo "Good Faith Bargaining in Canadian Labour Law" (2000) Prepared for The Council of 
Trade nions, ew Zealand, 14. 
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Machinists and Aerospace Workers, Beothuck Lodge 1763 and Courtesy Chrysler 
held ,119 
the mere tendering of a proposal which is unacceptable or even "predictably unacceptable" i
s not 
sufficient, standing alone, to allow the Board to draw an inference of "surface bargaining". 
This 
inference can only be drawn from the totality of the evidence including, but not restricted to
, the 
adoption of an inflexible position on issues central to negotiations. It is only when the condu
ct of 
the parties on the whole demonstrates that one side has no intention of concluding a colle
ctive 
agreement, notwithstanding its preservation of the outward manifestations of bargaining, th
at a 
finding of"surface bargaining" can be made. 
In regard to whether one party can insist on a proposal even though it knows it is 
unacceptable to other party, the Board in Catholic Independent Schools, Diocese of 
Prince George v B.C Government and Service Employee's Union
120 held this depends on 
the circumstances. The issue is whether the proposal was merely designed to frustrate 
bargaining. 
The Board in Scott Chapman et al. and International Association of Machinists 
and Aerospace Workers, Beothuck Lodge 1763 and Courtesy Chrysle/
21 agreed hard 
bargaining does not mean "a party may take some obviously unacceptable position and 
stick to it, thus thwarting the attainment of the collective agreement."
122 In this case the 
employer had offered a 17% wage rollback. The union argued this was "so clearly 
unreasonable and unacceptable that it could only have been intended to split the union 
and provoke a decertification application."
123 One of the employer ' s negotiators had 
admitted the figure was " pulled out of the air" and he knew the union would not accept it. 
o financial justification was provided by the employer for this proposal. 
119 
Scott Chapman et al. and International Association of Machinists and Aerospace Workers, B
eothuck 
lodge 1763 and Courtesy Chrysler (200 I) 77 CLRBR (2d) 92, Para, 29. 
120 Catholic Independent Schools, Diocese of Prince George v B.C Government and Service Em
ployee's 
Union [200 I ]69 CLRBR (2d) I, Para 124. 
121 Scot/ Chapman et al. and International Association of Machinists and Aerospace Workers, B
eothuck 
lodge 1763 and Courtesy Ch1ysler above, Para 22. 
122 Scot/ Chapman et al. and International Association of Machinists and Aerospace Workers, B
eothuck 
l odge 1763 and Courtesy Ch1ysler above, Para 20 citing Pierce Fisheries lid v Newfoundland
 FFA W, (9 
November 1984) NSLRB o.3080. 
123 Seo/I Chapman et al. and International Association of Machinists and Aerospace Workers, B
eothuck 
lodge 1763 and Courtesy Ch1ysler above, Para 22. 
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Canadian cases similarly to those in the US, have found surface bargaining in 
situations where one party employs tactics such as reneging on an established position or 
tabling new (and less favourable) demands without good reason. Southam Inc and GCJU, 
Local 34-M ,u held tactics that may indicate surface bargaining include reneging on 
positions already agreed to without compelling reason and "receding horizon" bargaining 
where new issues or proposals are unjustifiably introduced late in the bargaining. Surface 
bargaining may also be found where one party does an "about-face" and withdraws from 
agreement on matters that are already the subject of tentative agreement. This is also 
known as "moving the goalposts".
125 Repeatedly shifting "the goal posts" on core issues 
could be viewed as intending to avoid agreement and failing to bargain in good faith. 
C Conclusions on Surface Bargaining 
Surface bargaining or "going through the motions" will violate s 32(1) of the 
ERA. Unions and employers have a duty to fully discuss proposals, explain the 
reasoning behind their support for, or opposition to a proposal and genuinely consider 
proposals and alternative options put forward by the other side. Although there is no duty 
to agree on any matter or to conclude a collective agreement, there is arguably a duty 
similar to that in Canada to make every reasonable effort to reach agreement. Employers 
and unions should ensure the totality of their objective actions evidence a genuine 
intention to bargain for a collective agreement. From a survey of North American 
jurisprudence, parties should avoid making patently unreasonable, unacceptable or 
impossible proposals, taking an inflexible stance on issues without legitimate 
explanation, making regressive proposals, delaying bargaining without genuine reasons, 
reneging on matters previously agreed on, and introducing new proposals at the last 
minute. 
124 (2000) 63 CLRBR (2d) 65 cited in Geoff Davenport and Judy Brown Good Faith in Collective 
Bargaining (Lexis exis Butterworths, Wellington, 2002.) 71. 
125 Gina Fiorillo "Good Faith Bargaining in Canadian Labour Law" (2000) Prepared for The Council of 
Trade Unions, ew Zealand, 14-1 5. 
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IV "PARALLEL BARGAINING" - CAN EMPLOYERS BARGAIN WITH NON-
UNION MEMBER EMPLOYEES CONCURRENTLY OR PRIOR TO BARGAINING 
WITH UNIONS? 
The next part of this paper addresses the question of whether an employer can 
bargain with non-union employees before or at the same time as bargaining with unions 
for a collective agreement. It is argued that the disparity of treatment between employees 
who are represented in bargaining and those who are not may be a real challenge for 
parties under the ERA.
126 The real issue appears to be how the terms a union can 
effectively bargain for will be affected by other negotiations or settlements involving the 
employer. One of the purposes of the Act is to promote collective bargaining.
127 This 
needs to be remembered when examining permissible tactics in this area. 
A ERA Prohibition on Preference and Voluntary Union Membership - Sections 7 
and9 
Union membership under the ERA is voluntary but only unions are empowered to 
negotiate collective employment agreements. Section 7 (a) states that employees have the 
freedom to choose whether or not to form a union or be members of a union for the 
purpose of advancing their collective employment interests. Individuals can be 
represented by the person ( or people) of their choice in negotiations.
128 
Section 9 of the Act promotes equality between union and non-union members. It 
provides that an agreement cannot confer on someone because of their union status, 
preference in obtaining or attaining employment, or preference regarding terms and 
conditions of employment. This section intends to prohibit favouritism but does not 
necessarily prohibit negotiations with non-union members prior to or concurrently to 
unions. Section 9(2) provides that there must be a causal connection between the 
126 Davenport and Brown, above, 23 . 
127 Employment Relations Act 2000, s 3(a)(iii) 
128 P Churchman & P Roth , Employment Relations Act 2000 (New Zealand Law Society 2000) 3. 
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preference and membership or non-membership of a union or one union in particular.
129 
Therefore employers must ensure and be able to show that any disparity between terms 
and conditions is legitimate and justifiable, not due to preferential treatment on the basis 
of whether or not an employee is a union member. 
B Duty not to undermine - s 32(l)(d)(iii) 
1 Setting the standard 
Under the ERA whether or not concurrent bargaining or bargaining with non-
union members prior to unions is permissible may depend on whether confidence in the 
union 's ability to bargain effectively for a collective agreement is affected. It will need 
to be asked whether the employer's conduct is undermining, or likely to undermine, the 
authority of the union. Unions might be concerned that if bargaining takes place with 
non-union employees first a low standard may be set in regard to terms and conditions 
which the union may find difficult to improve on. 
Problems also occur if negotiations with the union take place first. There is no 
express prohibition in the ERA stopping employers from passing on the terms from the 
collective agreement to non-union members. This could have the effect of decreasing the 
benefits of collective bargaining to union members and undermining the union·s 
authority. In response to this some unions for example the PSA, have sought additional 
benefits for their members such as better annual leave provisions.
130 There is still doubt 
over whether there is a breach of good faith if an employer agrees to different terms with 
one group through genuine negotiation. Employers will need to be cautious and show 
that they are genuinely negotiating with the particular group concerned and not simply 
transferring conditions and limits based on other negotiations. They will also need to 
ensure any differences are for good reason rather than because of potential anti-union 
a111 mus. 
129 Davenpo11 and Brown, above, I 37. 
130 Davenport and Brown, above, I 36. 
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The problem for an employer bargaining with more than one party, whether it be 
two unions or one union and non-union employees, is that either they will have to bargain 
at the same time, or one or other of the negotiations has to take place first. Therefore the 
standard for employers will probably be the same whatever the order of negotiations. 
This is a difficult issue but with the focus of the ERA on promoting collective bargaining 
employers will have to ensure that they go to every length not to undermine the position 
or authority of the union when bargaining with other parties concurrently. 
2 New Zealand Case Law 
In a recent case before the Employment Relations Authority
131 three unions (the 
Customs Officers Association (COA), the New Zealand Public Service Association 
(PSA) and the National Union of Public Employees (NUPE)) were bargaining with the 
same employer and initially agreed to consolidate the bargaining for a collective 
agreement. A proposed settlement was reached but was rejected by the membership of all 
three unions. The PSA believed that the consolidated bargaining had reached an 
irrevocable conclusion and initiated bargaining for a separate collective agreement with 
the employer. The COA sought an assurance from the employer that it would only offer 
its members terms virtually the same as the PSA 's proposed agreement. The employer 
emailed staff stating that it would invite the two other unions to consider the new 
proposed settlement with PSA. They also stated that they would, 
132 
continue to work with all unions to listen to, and consider options. However, our good
 faith 
commitments mean we will not be entering into a settlement with one Union and agreein
g to a 
"better deal" with another. 
The Customs Officers Association (COA) filed for an injunction to stop any 
ratification meetings in regard to the PSA 's collective agreement and a compliance order 
requiring the PSA to act in good faith towards the COA by dealing with the employer in 
terms of the consolidating bargaining process. One of the reasons the COA alleged there 
131 Customs Officers Association v The New Zealand Public Service Association (Inc) (22July 2002) 
Employment Relations Authority Auckland, AA209A/02, Tom Woods. 
132 Customs Officers Association v The New Zealand Public Service Association (Inc), above, 2. 
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was bad faith behaviour was that ··if the collecti e employment between the [employer] 
and the [PSAJ comes into force. it \vould be impossible for the [COAJ to have proper 
negotiations with the [employer] to conclude an agreement on different terms··
133 The 
COA argued that .. unless there is an opportunit) to reso lve issues with the [employer] it 
would be likely that the [COAJ \\Ould be confronted \\ith a f ail accompli which would 
unfairly disadvantage the [COA] member :· 13.: 
The Authority held that the claim rai ed threshold issues as to the good faith 
practices required of the parties particular!) the conduct of inter union parties in olved in 
consolidated bargaining. The Authorit) \\ as unable to conclude \\ ith certainty that the 
PSA would be able to successfully counter all the claims and therefore concluded that 
there were serious issues for determination . It also held that in terms of granting an 
injunction the balance of convenience should fall in favour of the COA because there was 
"greater potential of detriment to the [COAfs bargaining position that outweigh[ed] any 
detriment to the respondent if the ratification process is deferred.". 135 Although this case 
involved multiple unions rather than union and non-union employees. it shows that the 
Authority may recognise that bargaining bet\\'een the employer and one part, may 
negatively affect another party"s ability to negotiate different terms with the same 
employer. 
C North American Jurisprudence 
1 Canada 
Several Canadian cases support the view that offering employees co ered by 
collective agreements less favourable terms and conditions than non-union members can 
be an example of bad faith unless the employer can prove that the di crepancy i due to 
133 Customs Officers Association v The Nell' Zealand Public Service Association (Inc). abo, e. 3. 
134 Customs Officers Association v The Nell' Zealand Public Serrice Association (Inc}. abO\ e. 3. 
135 Customs Officers Association v The Nell' Zealand Public Serrice Associarion (Inc). abO\ e. 7. 
,., ') _,_ 
legitimate financial reasons.
136 One such example is Atlantic Whole alers Ltd and 
UFCW, Local 1288P (, o. 2).
137 In the original hearing the Board required wage 
proposals which would guarantee parity of wage rates between the employees within the 
six bargaining units and non-unionised employees once any particular unit met the 
employer's expectations of profitability. It stated that the employer's proposals should 
reflect the economic conditions at each of the bargaining units. The Board outlined the 
position taken in Canadian jurisprudence on this issue, which it said indicated the 
I 
, . . 138 
emp oyer s insistence, 
on terms for unionised employees inferior to those enjoyed by non-unionised employees in the 
same circumstances raises a prima facie inference of anti-union animus and breach of[the] duty of 
good faith bargaining. But such does not comprise a per se violation and can pass statutory muster 
where shown to be rooted in a legitimate business justification established by the employer. 
The employer offered inferior wage rates for the unions that could be improved by 
sustained achievement of profitability. The union sought an order directing the employer 
to offer immediate parity of rates based on the theory that any disparity would evidence 
bad faith. The Board in the revisited decision held to "deduce from [the original panel's] 
reasons a requirement that the employer ensure parity of wages as between its unionised 
and non-unionised sectors immediately upon achievement of profitability at each 
unit. .. would be a misreading of its decision."
139 It held that evidence of parity of wages 
rates across the non-unionised sector regardless of profitability was insufficient to prove 
that disparity in the unionised sector is determinative of bad faith and anti-union animus. 
In order for a finding of bad faith in regard to disparate terms for unionised and non-
unionised employees the employees have to be in the same circumstances. 
140 In this case 
that test was not satisfied. 
136
Geoff Davenport and Judy Brown Good Faith in Collective Bargaining (Lexis exis Butterworths, 
Wellington , 2002.) 133. 
137 
( 1999) 52 CLRBR (2d) 142 
138 Atlantic Wholesalers Ltd and UFCW, Local I 288P (No. 2) ( 1999) 52 CLRBR (2d) I 0. 
139 Atlantic Wholesalers Ltd and UFCW, Local 1288P (No. 2/
39 above, 11. 
140 Atlantic Wholesalers Ltd and UFCW, Local 1288P (No. 2/
40 above, 13 . 
33 
2 us 
These arguments were applied similarly where non-union members protested 
disparate terms in a 1994 decision of the Supreme Court of lowa. 141 The court is this 
case held that, 142 
equal protection requires that people who are similarly situated be treated similarly ... [t]he two 
groups here are not... [ o ]ne is unionised; the other is not. The unioni sed group was subject to a 
court order compelling a set pay increase: the other group was not subject to that order. 
The cow1 also stated that the employer (in this case the State) could have made a rational 
decision not to award equal pay increases to non-union employees for economic reasons. 
There was nothing in the statute that expressly required equality in pay increases for 
unionised and non-unionised employees and the Plaintiffs in this case failed to displace 
their burden of showing there was no rational basis for the disparate pay increases. The 
Plaintiffs alleged that pay disparities would coerce union membership, but the court held 
there was nothing to support this allegation. 
D Conclusions on "Parallel Bargaining" 
The ERA aims to promote collective bargaining, at the same time s 9 prohibits 
preferential treatment on the basis of union membership. Whether an employer is 
bargaining with non-union employees or a union first in time, they will need to shovv they 
have conducted genuine negotiations with each party. Generally union members and 
non-union employees in the same circumstances should have parity of terms and 
conditions. If there are differences, these will need to be based on legitimate economic 
reasons. The employer will have to show they were at no stage motivated by anti-union 
animus or behaving in a manner that could undermine the union·s authority in the 
bargaining. 
141 Ruth Kelly, et al. , v State of Iowa, Judicial Department and State Court Administrator, William J. 
0 'Brien, and A FSSME!lowa Council 61 [ 1994] 525 . W.2d 409; 1994 Iowa Sup. 
142 Ruth Kelly, et al., v State of Iowa, Judicial Department and State Court Administrator, William J. 
O 'Brien, and AFSSME/!01va Council 61 above, 411 . 
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V EMPLOYER-EMPLOYEE COMMUNICATIONS UNDER THE ERA 
There seems to be some uncertainty regarding whether employers will be 
permitted to communicate to represented employees during collective bargaining. 
Davenport and Brown state that the area of employer-employee communication is one 
that is likely to result in litigation under the ERA.
143 This part of the paper sets out the 
relevant provisions under the ERA, and examines North American jurisprudence and 
commentary from various academics in this area to establish what tactics may be 
permissible under the new Act. 
A ECA - Factual Information (Ivamy) 
(Section 12 of the ECA provided for recognition of the authority of the parties ' 
representatives in the bargaining. The Court of Appeal held that although this 
' recognition ' requirement prevented direct negotiation between an employer and 
employees represented by a union , it did allow employers to make direct factual 
communications to employees relating to the reasonableness of a union 's claim for a 
collective agreement.
144 Under this regime it has been argued that " [e]mployers who 
wanted to undermine a union could bid against it by offering workers better terms. As a 
result ... employer communications with workers became a tool for undermining the union 
and destroying collective bargaining."
145 This position appears to have been altered by 
the ERA.
146 
143 
Geoff Davenport and Judy Brown Good Faith in Collective Bargaining (LexisNexis Butterworths, 
Wellington, 2002.) 51. 
144 
New Zealand Fire Service Commission v lvamy [ 1996) I ERNZ 85 cited in John Hughes "The 
Collective Bargaining Code of Good Faith" (2001) 26 NZJIR 59, 71. 
145 Ellen Dannin, "Good Faith Bargaining, Direct Dealing and Information Requests: The US Experience" 
(200 I) 26 NZJIR 45, above, 53. 
146 
P Churchman & P Roth , Employment Relations Act 2000 (New Zealand Law Society 2000) 17. 
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B Relevant ERA Provisions - s 32(J)(d), s 5 "bargaining" and s 4(3) 
Section 32(l)(d) of the ERA places restrictions on communications by employers 
to employees during bargaining. Firstly the employer must recognise the role and 
authority of the union as representative of the other party. Also they must not (directly or 
indirectly) bargain about matters relating to terms and conditions of employment with 
persons whom the representative or advocate are acting for. Finally the employer must 
not undermine, or do anything that is likely to undermine the bargaining, or the authority 
of the other in the bargaining. ) . 
1 Intent of Act/Alterations to Bill 
Section 32(1)(d) was altered from its original form in the ER Bill, which initially 
prohibited all negotiations and communications relating to terms and conditions of 
employment. 147 This clause roused much opposition from employers, as it appeared to 
b II 
. . . 148 
an a commu111cat1ons on any topic. The select committee removed the words 
'negotiate or communicate' from the clause. They stated in the explanatory note that the 
blanket ban on communication was "arguably excessive".
149 Then s 32(1)(d)(iii) was 
added to manage the risk of deleting "communication".
150 According to a Government 
press release on the gth of August 2000, the intent of the section was to constrain the kind 
of bargaining seen in cases that required Court intervention under the ECA.
151 
During the development of the Code for Good Faith Bargaining it became 
apparent that the Committee could not agree on the issue of communication during 
bargaining. 152 The Chairperson of the select committee sought clarification from the 
Department of Labour as to the policy intent behind the communications provisions. The 
147 Hughes, above, 72. 
148 Hughes, above, 72. 
149 Geoff Davenport "Good Faith Bargaining - What Does It Really Mean?" (2000] 6 ELB 120, 122 
150 Ma::engarb 's Employment lmv "Employment Relations Act 2000" (Lexis exis Butterworths, 
Wellington, 2002.) Para [Erpt5.5] and [32.11] "Recognising the role and authority of, epresentatives" 
151 Ma::engarb 's Employment lmv, above, Para [Erpt5.5] "The prohibition on undermining the bargaining 
process" 
152 John Hughes "The Collective Bargaining Code of Good Faith" (2001) 26 NZJ I R 59, 72 
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reply was that the intent of the Act is to permit direct communications relating to 
bargaining during bargaining so long as they, 
153 
a) Would not directly or indirectly mislead or deceive, or be likely 
to mislead or deceive, the party that receives them; 
b) Do not constitute direct or indirect bargaining; 
c) Do not undermine the bargaining itself; and 
d) Do not undermine the authority of any representative involved in 
the bargaining. 
The Department also stated that it was, 
154 
" implicit.. .that any such direct communication will be legitimate. For example if the employer 
felt like the union was not properly informing the workers, then direct communication with them 
is not the good faith matter. That is a good faith issue between the employer and the union , which 
must in exercise of its good faith obligations communicate accurately with its members." 
This seems to suggest that the ERA is not designed to limit all communications from 
employer to employee but only those which are misleading or deceiving, undermine or 
have the potential to undermine the bargaining, or themselves constitute direct or indirect 
bargaining. The Department' s statement also shows that unions owe a duty to their 
members and the employer to communicate the employer's position accurately. This will 
be discussed more fully below. 
It is likely that employers are free to communicate directly with their employees 
about daily operational matters during bargaining under the ERA. This recognises the 
benefits to all parties of preserving paid and productive employment as much as possible 
during collective bargaining.
155 In regard to communications about the bargaining itself, 
Davenport and Brown suspect "direct communications to employees about bargaining 
will be permissible, but with a number of significant caveats"
156 and that at any disputed 
communication will need to be assessed on its own merits. The Code does not assist in 
153 Department of Labour 2000, in Hughes, above, 72-73. 
154 Department of Labour 2000, in Hughes, above, 72-73 . 
155 Geoff Davenport and Judy Brown Good Faith in Collective Bargaining (LexisNexis Butterworths, 
Wellington, 2002 .) 107. 
156 Davenport and Brown, above, l l 0. 
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this regard as the only reference to communication in the Code is as something the parties 
should consider dealing with in their bargaining arrangement under paragraph 2.2n. 
2 s 4(3) 
Another factor that suggests not all communications relating to the bargaining will 
be prohibited is the inclusion of s 4(3) of the Act. Section 4(3) states that the general 
obligation of good faith "does not prevent a party to an employment relationship 
communicating to another person a statement of fact or opinion reasonably held about an 
employer's business or a union 's affairs". A communication could fall within s 4(3) and 
still relate to bargaining, therefore the inclusion of this section runs counter to the view 
that all employer communications relating to bargaining are prohibited. 157 Also if no 
communications relating to the bargaining where allowed, why would the drafters have 
added s 32(1)(d)(iii)? It could also be said that a total ban on communications may raise 
concerns regarding the employer's right to freedom of expression under the New Zealand 
Bill of Rights Act 1990. 158 Finally it will be shown that it is consistent with North 
American jurisprudence to allow direct communications that fall within the good faith 
. 159 regime. 
Section 4(3) is not an absolute right, untrue statements or opinions without 
reasonable foundation will clearly not fall within the scope of this section 160 and in 
practices 4(3) is heavily qualified by the obligation to bargain in good faith particularly 
by s 32(1)(d). Therefore communications between employers and their employees who 
are represented by a union , especially in regard to matters that are the subject of 
negotiations, have to be undertaken very carefully in order not to breach that section. The 
writer could find no judicial comment as yet on this section. It will be interesting to see 
how the judiciary treats s 4(3) and to what extent it will be qualified bys 32(1)(d). 
157 Davenport and Brown, above, I 09. 
158 Davenport and Brown, above, I 09. 
159 Davenport and Brown, above, I 09. 
160 Davenport and Brown, above, 115 . 
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3 Extended definition of "bargaining" - s 5 
The definition of "bargaining" 1s integral to deciding whether an 
employer/employee communication breaches s 32(d)(ii). Section 5 states that 
"bargaining" in relation to a collective agreement means all the interactions between the 
paities to the bargaining that relate to the bargaining and includes, 
(i) negotiations that relate to the bargaining; and 
(ii) communications or correspondence (between or on behalf of the 
parties before, during, or after negotiations) that relate to the 
bargaining. 
This wide definition of bargaining suggests firstly that good faith obligations will not be 
confined to the period between the formal initiation of bargaining and the commencement 
f II · 
161 
o a co ect1ve agreement. Secondly the use of the terms "directly or indirectly" 
suggests that communications which might otherwise not appear to be bargaining but that 
have the effect of bargaining will fall within the definition.
162 Therefore many activities 
that were not caught under the ECA may be held to be bargaining under the ERA as there 
is scope for the Authority and the Courts to take a broader view of prohibited 
communications.
163 
Union misinforming members 
During the development of the rules for communication to employees, employers 
were concerned about misrepresentation by unions to their members. However good 
faith imposes an obligation on the employer and union parties to fairly represent the other 
161 
Ma:::engarb 's Employment law "Employment Relations Act 2000" (LexisNexis Butterworths, 
Wellington, 2002.) Para [Erpt5 .5] "The significance of the definition of bargaining". 
162 Ellen Dannin, "Good Faith Bargaining, Direct Dealing and Information Requests: The US Experience" 
(2001) 26 NZJIR 45, 53. 
163 Geoff Davenport and Judy Brown Good Faith in Collective Bargaining (LexisNexis Butterworths, 
Wellington, 2002.) 114. 
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party's position m negot1at1ons when they are reporting back to their principals.
164 
Davenport and Brown state, 165 
a representative has an obligation to accurately report back to its constituents on the progress or 
otherwise at the bargaining table ... Keeping constituents or sectors of a constituency in the dark 
about bargaining raises good faith issues between representatives and their members and 
[regarding] the whole bargaining process. 
Certainly under section 32(1)(d)(iii) this could be seen as undermining the bargaining by 
presenting an incorrect or misleading picture to union members. It could also be seen as 
misleading or deceptive behaviour towards union members under s 4(1)(b). There is US 
case law (discussed further on) to suggest that Courts may be lenient on communications 
where the employer is answering allegations by the union. However if an employer 
suspects a union of misleading its members the most prudent course of action would be to 
discuss this with the union, provide them with any proposed communications and give 
them reasonable opportunity to respond and redress the situation, before going to the 
employees directly. 
5 Provide communications to the union first 
The Department of Labour has pointed out the importance under the ERA of 
providing any proposed communications to the union a reasonable amount of time before 
providing them to employees, 166 
any communications that one party to bargaining intends to make directly to the people affected by 
the bargaining should be provided in advance to the representatives of those people. A reasonable 
opportunity to discuss the purpose and content of the direct communications should also be 
provided. 
The reasoning behind this is that providing a new proposal to a union at the same time as 
or shortly before conveying it directly to employees may deny the union time to consider 
the proposal and to advise its members as to the implications. This could cut across the 
164 Ma::engarb 's Employment law "Employment Relations Act 2000" (Lexis exis Butterworths, 
Wellington, 2002.) Para [ER32.04] 
165 Davenport and Brown, above, 121. 
166 Department of Labour 2000, in John Hughes "The Collective Bargaining Code of Good Faith" (200 I) 
26 NZJIR 59, 79. 
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advisory role of the union and may therefore violate s 32(d)(i).
167 The requirement to 
provide communications to the union first has been evident in North American 
jurisprudence and is likely to be an essential requirement for employers to fulfil in order 
to make communications in good faith. 
C North American Jurisprudence 
1 us 
Section 8(a)(5) of the NLRA promotes the union's status as representative, which 
the employer must not undermine with attempts to avoid the union or act as if it were not 
the employees' representative.
168 Section 8(a)(2) provides that neither the employer nor 
the union is to interfere with the others operation as representative.
169 Although the 
NLRA does not have an equivalent to s 32(1)(d)(ii) of the ERA, it has been held that an 
employer violates its duty to bargain in good faith when it treats directly with 
employees.
170 This ban is not absolute and under the NLRA many types of 
communications are permitted. Employers may communicate the facts of their bargaining 
position or offer and their perspective on the current situation regarding the negotiations 
but must refrain from undue influence, threats or coercion.
171 
A key part of the analysis of whether s 8(a)(2) of the NLRA is breached is the 
meaning of 'dealing with'. This has been defined as a bilateral process; one side makes 
proposals or suggestions with the intent that the other side responds to them.
172 
Communications that do not constitute 'dealing with' include cases where the action is 
uni-directional such as suggestion boxes, brainstorming sessions, or employee panels 
167 Davenport and Brown, above, I 05. 
168 
Ellen Dannin , "Good Faith Bargaining, Direct Dealing and Information Requests: The US Experience" 
(2001) 26 ZJIR 45 , 54 
169 Dannin, above, 54 
170 JI.Case v NLRB (1944) 321 NLRB 332 cited in Dannin, above, 54 
171 Anne Knowles & James Ritchie Practical Implications of Good Faith Bargaining (Report of Study Tour 
to USA and Canada 200 I) [200 I] ZJIR 59,4 . 
in Dannin , abov~54 
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which have the sole power to make decisions.
173 For example in Permanente Medical 
Group Inc174 it was held to be acceptable to hold "job re-design" meetings where the 
employer merely sought information for potential future action and to formulate 
bargaining proposals which were not directed at avoiding the union's role. However in 
an earlier case, Harris- Teeter Super Markets Inc
175 the employer was held to have 
eroded a union's bargaining position by trying to find out employee sentiment directly 
from employees instead of discussing this solely with the union. It can be argued that part 
of union ' s role is to convey the views of members to a bargaining counterpart. Therefore 
it may not be safe to rely on uni-directional communications and whether this is found to 
be a breach of good faith may depend on the rest of the circumstances surrounding the 
bargaining. 
Brown v SIU (Sedpex Inc/ 76 emphasised the significance of the content of the 
communication, stating that, 
if an employer speaks the truth, and does so moderately and rationally, exercising appropriate 
recognition ofthe·legitimacy and role of the bargaining agent, the communication will probably be 
judged to be within the realm of permissibility. Where the communication does not distort the 
truth or mislead, sets out a reasonably fair and accurate summary of the situation, does not 
denigrate the union or have the purpose and effect of undermining its efforts to represent its 
people, it can be considered to be outside the prohibition. 
The purpose of the communication may also be important. In NLRB v Thompson 
Products Inc 177 some bulletins distributed to employees by the employer were in response 
to union attacks on management. The Board held, "the respondents were not required 
under the law to permit these attacks to go unanswered, for the right of free speech is 
enjoyed by employers as well as by employees."
178 They held that the bulletins were not 
coercive and under the United States Constitution their distribution could not be held to 
violate law. It should be remembered that these findings are in the context of the very 
in Dannin , abov~55 
174 Permanente Medical Group Inc 323 NLRB No I 06 (Oct 31 ,2000) cited in Dann in, above, 54. 
175 31 O NLRB 216 ( 1993) cited in Geoff Davenport and Judy Brown Good Faith in Collective Bargaining 
(Lexis exis Butterworths, Wellington , 2002.) I 06. 
176 
( 1988), 72 di 148, 159-160 cited in Davenport and Brown, above, I I 0. 
177 NLRB v Thompson Products Inc, [1947] 162 F 2d 287 (6th Cir) 297. 
178 NLRB v Thompson Products Inc, above, 297 . 
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strong free speech environment of the US and may not be directly applicable in the New 
Zealand context. 
2 Canada 
Jn Canada there are many examples of employers communicating with 
employees. This part of the paper outlines some of these decisions to illustrate how the 
courts have responded to various employer-employee communications. 
In Glenwood Label and Box Manufacturing Ltd and Communication Energy and 
Paper workers Union of Canada, 
179 part of the collective bargaining strategy of both 
sides was to communicate directly with striking employees through bulletins. These 
bulletins would outline the parties ' views on the progress of negotiations in regard to 
offers made, prospects for settling the strike and the other party's conduct. The 
employer' s bulletins were faxed to the union before or at the same time they were handed 
out on the picket line. On July the 2nd the employer made a new contract offer to the 
union. Two days later it sent a bulletin to employees reporting the offer and stating that 
the terms were substantially more generous than the previous offer, including a wage 
offer of 62% above the previous "final offer" . It indicated that the union would respond 
to the offer on the 9th of July and expressed the view that the parties were to conclude an 
agreement. The union withdrew from bargaining on the same day. On July 10
1
h the 
union sent a bulletin to its members outlining the inadequacy of the offers and the 
employer' s response. The next day the employer distributed a bulletin to employees 
outlining the offers and amounts the union had turned down. Each employee was also 
given a sheet calculating the value of the offer to him or her personally. On August the 1
51 
the employer faxed a company bulletin to the union outlining a new wage offer. This was 
given to striking employees the following day. There were three different types of 
information communicated, a wage increase, a time limit on the final offer, and 
notification of a lockout. 
179 
( 12 September 1996) BCLRB o B 300/96. 
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The Board held that it is not illegal to issue bulletins reporting on what has 
happening in negotiating meetings. 180 However it stated that an employer breaches its 
duty to bargain in good faith if it presents its bargaining position to employees prior to 
presenting it to the union and giving the union the opportunity to discuss the offer.
18 1 
The employer has to communicate any offer to the union first and discuss this within a 
reasonable timeframe so the union can make an informed decision.
182 
The wage offer was the same as that put to the union. The union argued the wage 
offer was misleading. The board held that it may have been confusing but were not 
persuaded that the employer intended to mislead the employees. The board agreed with 
Noranda v Canadian Association of Industrial, Mechanical & Allied Workers
183 that if 
the board were to "evaluate every distortion of fact or inflation of opinion contained in 
material written during heated collective bargaining disputes" they would do little else. 
The lockout and time limit were not communicated to the union first therefore the Board 
held the employer was ' side-stepping' the union by communicating these to employees, 
which constituted a failure to bargain in good faith.
184 This case illustrates the importance 
of communicating information to the union first. It suggests that if this condition is met, 
communications by employers to employees in regard to the bargaining will be 
acceptable so long as they are not coercive or threatening and do not undermine the 
bargaining. 
In the decision of Re Rotor Rooter Canada Ltd v United Association of 
Journeymen and Apprentices of the Plumbing and Pipefilling Industry of the US and 
180 BC Sugar Refining Co Ltd. ( 1978) BCLR8 No. 49/7 cited in Glenwood label and Box Manufacturing 
Ltd and Communication Energy and Papen vorkers Union qf Canada ( 12 September 1996) 8 CLR8 o 8 
300/96, 13 . 
181 AAF Ltd ( 1985) BCLR8 No 8318/85 foll owed in Glemvood label and Box Manufacturing Ltd and 
Communication Energy and Paper workers Union of Canada above, 13 
182 British Columbia Hydro and Power Authority (1997) 8 CLRB o. 8 395/97, 11 cited in Glenwood label 
and Box Manufacturing Ltd and Communication Energy and Paper workers Union of Canada above, 13. 
183 [1975] I Can LRCR 145, 161 cited in Glenwood label and Box Manufacturing Ltd and Communication 
Energy and Paper workers Union of Canada, above, 14. 
184 Glemvood label and Box Manufacturing Ltd and Communication Energy and Paper workers Union of 
Canada above, 15. 
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Canada Local No 170
185 one of the union's requirements for a collective agreement was 
that the employer must agree to the union's apprenticeship programme. On the 4th of 
March the employer sent a memorandum to all service technicians offering their own 
apprenticeship programme. On the 13
1
h of March the employer informed the union that 
they would be offering an apprenticeship programme. The Board found that by offering 
the programme directly to employees the employer had breached the duty to bargain in 
good faith. "[T]he union's credibility and its ongoing ability to bargain with the employer 
might well have been damaged by the employer's action."
186 On another occasion at a 
staff dinner the talk turned to collective bargaining issues (the apprenticeship programme 
and the contract) and the employer representatives proceeded to address the questions of 
the employees. The Board held that the employer should have cut off all conversation at 
the point of the employees' questions and that they were in effect bargaining directly with 
the employees by answering the questions. This case again reinforces the importance of 
any information relating to the bargaining being presented to the union first. It also 
cautions employers not to communicate information directly to employees in seemingly 
social circumstances. 
In the British Columbia Automobile Association
187 case both parties engaged 111 
extensive communications each putting across their own version of the negotiations. It 
was held that they were in effect bargaining away from the table by way of bulletins. The 
Board found that by adopting this method of bargaining both parties must accept the 
consequences. However the employer crossed the line when it communicated acceptance 
of a mediator's recommendations to employees without first communicating that position 
to the union. It should be noted that the statements from the employer were in this case 
misleading, as the mediator had not in fact made any "recommendations". 
185 
(31 January 1997) BCLRB 515 No 835/97 
186 Re Rota-Rooter Canada Ltd v United Association of Journeymen and Apprentices of the Plumbin
g and 
Pipejifling lnd11st1y of the US and Canada local No 170 (31 January 1997) BCLRB 515 No 835/97
, 9 
187 British Columbia Automobile Association v Office and Professional Employees International Uni
on, 
(1999) BCLRB o 8498/99 cited in Gina Fiorillo "Good Faith Bargaining in Canadian Labou
r Law" 
(2000) Prepared for The Council of Trade Unions, New Zealand, 19. 
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In Associated Building Credits Ltd v National Automobile, Aerospace, 
Transportation & General Workers Union of Canada (CAW Canada) Local ../23-1'
88 prior 
to the commencement of bargaining various bulletins were issued by both parties and 
directed to employees. The employer claimed one of the union's bulletins was inaccurate 
and libellous. The employer then refused to bargain as they claimed the union was acting 
in bad faith. The board held the union ' s bulletin was not in violation of the duty to 
bargain in good faith and the employer was in breach of its duty by refusing to bargain. 
This illustrates that it is dangerous for a party to refuse to bargain even if they suspect the 
other party is in breach of their good faith duties. Jt is better to discuss any issues or 
disagreements and show genuine commitment to resolving them. 
Some generalisations on employer-employee communications can be drawn from 
the North American jurisprudence. The following tactics are likely to be permissible in 
the US and Canada, 
a) Providing information to employees that has been provided in advance to the 
union, with a reasonable opportunity being given for discussion of content and 
purpose of dissemination; 
b) Communication which is not directed at avoiding or subverting the union; 
c) Communication that is not coercive or intimidating towards employees, detai ling 
such things as workplace operations, and the outcome of negotiation meeting ; 
189 
and possibly; 
d) Where the employer is merely seeking informational in a uni-directional manner: 
Whether these will be allowed under s 32(1)(d) of the ERA is unclear but they do provide 
some guidelines on the types of communications that may be acceptable. 
Davenport and Brown state from an analysis of orth American ea es, the 
following factors could be relevant to whether or not a communication will be 
permissible, 
a) The context of the communication and the employer' s behaviour; 
190 
188 (1999) BCLRB o.454/99 cited in Gina Fiorillo "Good Faith Bargaining in Canadian Labour Law" 
(2000) Prepared for The Council of Trade nions, ew Zealand, 38. 
189 P Churchman & P Roth, Employment Relations Act 2000 ew Zealand Law ociety 2000) 18. 
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b) What the communication conveys as a whole. It is important to look at the 
communication as a whole not just some phrases in isolation; 
191 
c) Whether there is an agreement between the parties addressing direct 
communication; (In New Zealand the prohibition on bargaining in s 32(1 )(d)(ii) 
does not apply if the union and employer agree otherwise.) 
d) The history of bargaining relationship and whether there have been any other 
communications 192 as well as the maturity of the relationship of the parties; 
193 
e) Whether both parties have been engaging in similar communications? (See the 
British Columbia Automobile Association above.) 
f) The reason for the communication, for example whether the employer is 
· · b 194 answering previous untrue statements y a counterpart; 
g) Whether it invites a response from employees. 
h) The content of the communication. Is it coercive, denigrating, threatening, or a 
· · ?195 m1srepresentat1on. 
i) How the information was conveyed. A captive meeting or one that employees are 
invited to attend will be riskier. Statements that would otherwise be permissible 
may not be in the context of a captive audience meeting.
196 
j) When it was conveyed, how often, at what stage of bargaining process and along 
with what other conduct; 
197 
k) Who the recipients were and what the likely impact or effect on the collective 
bargaining process will be. The existence of employee vulnerability has been 
viewed as relevant in the US.
198 The question to ask is what the recipients could 
19° Fortinek Canada Corp v PSAC [ 1986] 14 CLRBR (NS) I cited in Geoff Davenport and Judy Brown 
Good Faith in Collective Bargaining (Lexis exis Butterworths, Wellington , 2002.) 110. 
191 NLRB v Algoma Plywood & Veener Co, [1941] 121 F 2d 602 (7th Cir) cited in Davenport and Brown, 
above, 111. 
192 Ottawa Citi::,en v Ottawa Newspaper Guild [ 1991] I O CLRBR (2d) 293 (Ont) cited in Davenport and 
Brown, above, I I I . 
193 Re BC Transit v OPEIU Local 378 [ 1999] 60 CLRBR (2d) 2678 (BC) cited in Davenport and Brown, 
above, 111 . 
194 NLRB v Thompson Products Inc, [ 1947] 162 F 2d 287 (6th Cir) cited in Davenport and Brown, above, 
I I I. 
195 Davenport and Brown, above, 112. 
196 Cardinal Transportation BC Inc v COPE, Local 561 [1996] 34 CLRBR (2d) I (BC) cited in Davenport 
and Brown, above, I 12. 
197 Davenport and Brown, above, 113. 
198 Hem y I Siegel Co v NLRB, [ 1969] 417 F 2d 1206 (6th Cir) cited in Davenport and Brown, above, 113. 
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reasonably conclude from what was said? 199 (In New Zealand with recognition of 
the need to acknowledge the inherent inequality of bargaining power m 
employment relationships under s 3(a)(iii) whether employees are subject to 
workplace pressure could well be a significant factor. 200) 
These factors are likely to be adopted by ew Zealand courts in interpreting whether a 
particular communication is a breach of good faith in the circumstances of the case. 
D Likely position under the ERA 
Whether or not a communication to employees is held to be a breach of good faith 
under the ERA may depend on the type of communication used by the employer. There 
are some types of communication that will be more likely to constitute a breach. One 
method of determining what will be prohibited by the ERA is to look at the pre-ERA 
Court of Appeal decisions that the Act aimed to change through the prohibition on 
undermining the bargaining. These types of communication may therefore be proscribed, 
a) ··Captive audience" speeches or meetings, held to discuss 
the bargaining; 
b) The presentation of draft contracts directly to employees; 
c) Providing "information packs" to employees about the 
employer's proposals; 
d) Sending staff warning letters regarding strike action; 
e) Offering financial incentives directly to employees to sign 
the employer's proposed contact; 
f) Providing staff with "updates" on what the union has said 
in negotiations; 
g) Supplying forms asking for "feedback" on bargaining 
· 20 1 d issues; an 
h) Factual information communicated in a secret manner or 
with timing that appears to be strategic.2
02 
199 Hendrix Mfg Co v NLRB, [ 1963] 321 F 2d I 00 (5 '11 Cir) cited in Davenport and Brown, above, 113. 
200 Davenport and Brown, above, I 13. 
201 Ma::,engarb 's Employment law Wellington, Lexis exis Butterworths 2002, Para [ER32.12] 
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Also possibly prohibited under the ERA will be newspaper advertisements addressed to 
the general public but setting out the employer's proposals in enough detail to potentially 
influence employees and "undermine" the union .
203 
E Possible solution -Agreement on communications 
It has been suggested one way the parties could minimise uncertainty in this area 
is through an agreed framework on communications to employees.
204 The provisions of 
any agreement between the parties about good faith entered into by a union and employer 
is one consideration under s 32(3) in regard to whether the parties have acted in good 
faith. 205 
Davenport and Brown set out one possible approach for such an agreement. The main 
provisions of the agreement would be that,
206 
a) Any communication from employers to employees that refers to matters under discussion in 
collective bargaining will first be provided to the union(s) together with an explanation as to why 
the employer wishes to convey this material to its employees; 
b) The union(s) will be given a reasonable opportunity to respond to the employer on the proposed 
communication and the employer will consider any response with an open mind before deciding 
whether to issue the communication ; and 
c) If direct communication is intended to remedy an alleged breach of good faith by a union (such as 
allegedly inaccurate reporting back to constituents) the employer will provide the union with a 
reasonable opportunity to correct the breach before issuing the communication. 
This appears to be a sensible option for the parties to take to ensure each knows what is 
permissible in regard to employer-employee communications and the steps that need to 
be followed to ensure good faith bargaining is adhered to. 
202 P Churchman & P Roth, Employment Relations Act 2000 (New Zealand Law Society 2000) 18 . 
203 Ma:::engarb 's Employment Law Wellington, Lexis exis Butterworths 2002, Para [ER32. I 2] 
204 Geoff Davenport and Judy Brown Good Faith in Collective Bargaining (LexisNexis Butterworths, 
Wellington, 2002.) 51. 
205 Employment Relations Act 2000 s 32 (3)(b). 
206 Davenport and Brown, above, 51-52. 
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F Conclusions on Communications 
Under the ERA the safest communication an employer can make to employees is 
factual information that has been presented to the union before being communicated to 
the employees. In regard to the method of communication the employer should steer clear 
of anything resembling a ' captive meeting' situation, especially considering the 
recognition of the inherent inequality of the employment relationship in the Act. 
The issue of employer-employee communications under the ERA good faith 
regime has yet to be dealt with by the judiciary. Some hints for employers as to the 
tactics that are likely to be permissible can be gleaned from the intent of the bill , the 
purpose and text of the Act and North American jurisprudence. Nothing is certain until a 
case comes before the Authority or the Courts until which time it is better for employers 
to err on the side of caution when communicating with employees during collective 
bargaining. Employers should ensure they put any proposed communication to unions 
first, giving them a reasonable amount of time to consider and respond, and that any 
information communicated is non-coercive and factual in nature. The most prudent 
option may be for the union and employer to provide for employer-employee 
communications in an agreement setting out the rights and responsibilities of each party 
in this regard to ensure some degree of certainty. 
VI GENERAL CONCLUSION - LIKELY PERMISSIBLE TACTICS UNDER 
THE ERA 
The ERA has a very different flavour from its predecessor, requiring good faith 
behaviour and aiming to promote collective bargaining. Unlike North American good 
faith law, the ERA mainly through s 32 attempts to codify the obligations of employers 
and unions when bargaining for collective agreements. This paper has shown that there 
are issues still to be worked out. The Authority has suggested, and North American 
jurisprudence supports the view, that good faith will be considered on a case-by-case 
basis. Because these issues are yet to be dealt with by the Authority or the Courts it is 
50 
difficult to state with certainty what types of behaviour will be proscribed. Until then a 
cautious approach is recommended. 
In regard to the issues dealt with in this paper the following suggestions have been 
made. Regarding surface bargaining employers and unions should ensure the totality of 
their objective actions show a genuine intention to bargain. They should fully discuss, 
consider and respond to proposals, suggestions and alternatives put forward by the other 
side and avoid behaviours that could be seen as erecting barriers to bargaining. Where an 
employer is bargaining with a union as well as non-union employees, regardless of the 
order of negotiations they will need to demonstrate genuine negotiation with each party 
individually. Any disparity in terms should be based on legitimate economic reasons and 
not motivated by anti-union sentiment. Regarding employer-employee communications 
employers should put all proposed communications to the union first with reasonable 
time being given for the union to consider and respond. Employers and unions should 
consider providing for employer-employee communications in a good faith agreement for 
more certainty as to their rights and responsibilities in this respect. The development of 
the good faith obligation in collective bargaining in these areas in particular will be 
something to watch with interest over the coming years. 
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